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Abstract
A firm that faces insufficient supply of labor can either increase the
wage offer to attract more applicants, or reduce the hiring standard to
enlarge the pool of potential employees, or do both. This simultaneous
adjustment of wages and hiring standards in response to changes in
market conditions has been emphasized in a classical contribution by
Reder (1955) and leads to the effect that wage reactions to employment
changes can be expected to be more pronounced for low wage workers
than for high wage workers. This is the ‘Reder Hypothesis’.
The present contribution sets out to test this hypothesis using Ger-
man employment register data and a censored panel quantile regres-
sion approach. Our findings support the Reder Hypothesis, suggesting
that market clearing in labor markets is achieved by a combination of
wage adjustments and changes in hiring standards.
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1 Introduction
Reder’s (1955) hiring standards adjustment hypothesis is an alternative and
extension of the neoclassical wage competition framework. It states that
firms do not only adjust wages and take qualifications and ability as given in
recruitment processes, but may change hiring standards too. This seemingly
innocuous change of institutional procedures may generate an efficiency wage
effect, and may therefore be a possible explanation for equilibrium unemploy-
ment, wage discrimination and overqualification.1
Reder (1955) applies the hiring standards mechanism to explain occu-
pational wage differentials and the response of the wage structure to labor
demand changes. The main conclusion of his theory is that the lower part
of the wage distribution for a homogenous group of workers responds more
to labor demand changes than the upper. For a brief exposition of the ar-
gument consider the demand for workers with identical formal qualification
but differing ability and sort them with respect to ability. For sake of sim-
plicity assume that ability takes on only three different values, low, medium
and high. Assume furthermore that the production technology of the firm
requires all types of workers, e.g. an instructor, a standard worker and a
helper. Now, what would happen if the firm wants to extend its production
and requires one additional worker of each type? In a standard neoclassical
model wages of the high ability workers would respond more than wages of the
other groups to labor demand shifts in labor markets where unemployment
is higher for medium and low ability workers : If all high ability workers are
employed, competition drives up their wages. On the other hand, open slots
for medium and especially low ability workers can be filled from the unem-
ployment pool. Therefore their wages are expected to respond less strongly
in this framework.
Reder (1955) considers adjustment of the hiring standard as an alterna-
tive and/or complement: if additional high ability workers are not available,
firms can fill open slots by promoting medium ability workers. This throt-
tles upward pressure from wages of the high ability workers. Promotions,
however, create additional gaps for medium ability workers, leaving the firm
with even more open slots for medium ability workers. These slots can either
be filled by promoting low ability workers or by poaching workers from other
firms. Hence we expect wages to respond stronger if we move down the abil-
ity ladder since the gaps become larger at each step. This mechanism breaks
down only if all open slots can be filled from unemployed workers.
1The argument is developed in Schlicht (2005).
2
This implication can be tested empirically by running quantile regressions
(for different quantiles) of wages on unemployment and control variables for
a homogenous group of workers. If the hypothesis is correct, the response
of wages to unemployment changes should increase (in absolute value) as we
move from the upper to the lower part of the wage distribution, i.e. lower
quantiles of the (conditional) distribution should respond more strongly to
employment changes. It should be clear, however, that this operationaliza-
tion of the theory is not one-to-one and hinges on the identifying assumption
that additional labor demand is distributed similarly over the ability groups.
Note however, that higher sensitivity of lower wage quantiles with respect
to labor demand changes is compatible with a combination of human capital
and implicit contracts too. If high ability workers have accumulated more
firm-specific human capital than their colleagues, firms will retain them in
downturns and adjust labor demand by hiring and firing medium and low
ability workers. Then the relation between labor demand of high ability
workers and cyclical fluctuations is weaker than for the other groups, caus-
ing less pronounced wage responses. The difference between a pure hiring
standards setting and the specific human capital interpretation is not of great
importance, however, if the main purpose of the empirical exercise is to find
evidence for the existence of efficicency wage effects since pecific human cap-
ital is very likely to generate efficiency wage effects too.
Note however, that the empirical implications generated by the hiring
standards adjustment hypothesis are different from union bargaining models
with centralized (branch level) wage setting. Bu¨ttner & Fitzenberger (2003)
argue that union wage contracts set de-facto minimum wages for the low
wage groups. Consequently their wages are more likely paid according to
the centralized contract and should respond less to regional labor demand
fluctuations than wages in the upper part of the wage distribution. These
are more likely to be set in individual level bargaining and thus more prone
to regional labor demand shifts. The authors use a two-step (minimum dis-
tance) estimator to test their hypothesis and find it (weakly) confirmed by
the data. Their methods and the estimation period are different from ours.
The minimum distance estimator applied in their study is based on aggre-
gated data. This does not allow to control for composition bias (explained
below). Furthermore the model does not include fixed effects for individuals
or districts. Nevertheless the difference in results remains puzzling.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short lit-
erature review. In the first part of Section 3 we derive our empirical model
based on guidelines from theory. Then, we introduce our data set and discuss
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potential data problems or limitations in detail. In Section 4 we discuss the
quantile regression methods employed in this paper. Section 5 follows with
a short discussion of the results and we conclude with several qualifications
and plans for future work.
2 A Short Survey of the Literature
Our hypothesis in question is related to three strands of empirical literature.
The literature investigating business cycle effects on the level and structure
of wages, wage curve empirics and the empirical literature on wage rigidity.
While the correlations between income or wage levels and the business
cycle have been studied extensively (see e.g. Solon, Barsky, & Parker, 1994),
only a few contributions focus on income and wage dispersion. The obvious
reason for the selective interest seems to be that cyclicality of income and
wage levels plays an important role for business cycle theory, whereas no
interesting theoretical contributions for the effect of economic conditions on
the distribution of wages can be found in the literature.2 All empirical studies
on the relation between earnings distributions and unemployment stress the
argument that low income earners face higher unemployment risks or are
urged to reduce working hours more than other groups in downswings. This
implies a reduction of their income shares and – by that – an increase of the
income dispersion. Correlations between income inequality and (cyclical)
unemployment.
Empirical work on the relation between earnings or income inequality and
unemployment is based mainly on two simple specifications. The first is an
income share equation proposed by Blinder & Esaki (1978)
Sit = αi + βi Ut + γi pit + δi(t) + uit
where Sit denotes income share of quintile i in total earnings, Ut and pit denote
unemployment and inflation rates, respectively, and δi(t) is a deterministic
(nonlinear) time trend function. The five equations (one for each quintile)
have to be estimated under the adding-up restriction
∑5
i=1 Sit = 1 (see Haupt
& Oberhofer (2006)). In the second specification quintile Si is replaced by
an overall inequality measure as the Gini coefficients or the Theil index using
aggregated (national or regional level) time series
Gt = α+ β Ut + γ pit + δ(t) + ut
2The lack of theory is documented in Buse (1982).
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Parker (1999) surveys 12 studies of each type. For the income share approach
most of the studies report a significant negative effect of unemployment on
the lowest quintile and a significant positive on the highest. The only excep-
tions are Blank & Card (1993) and Bjo¨rklund (1991) who find insignificant
effects.3 The results from the inequality measure approach indicate positive
relations between income and unemployment, though only some of them are
statistically significant. However, these studies are not relevant in our con-
text as they analyze a composite effect of variations in wages, working hours
and the number of employed workers.
A second strand of empirical literature with a focus similar to our paper
is concerned with estimation of the relation between wages and regional un-
employment (dubbed the ‘wage curve’).4 To the best of our knowledge, all
work from this field implement conditional mean models and are therefore
not useful for testing the Reder hypothesis. The only work using similar tech-
niques to test a similar question (but delivering different results) is Bu¨ttner
& Fitzenberger (2003).
Several papers focussing on wage rigidity appear to show the strongest re-
lations to our work. Devereux (2000, 2002, 2004) stresses that Reder’s theory
implies dependence between occupational upgrading (quality adjustment)
and the business cycle. He tests this implication empirically by regressing
(a) shares of the high qualified in occupation cells, and (b) ocupation quality
proxies for occupation cells on unemployment rates and finds it confirmed.5
3 Model and data
3.1 The empirical model
As stated above, the Reder hypothesis implies that higher quantiles of the
conditional regional wage distribution respond less strongly to regional labor
demand changes than lower ones.
3The reason for the difference to other studies is that they exploit regional information
(including year and district dummies).
4See Blanchflower & Oswald (1995); Card (1995); Blanchflower & Oswald (2005) and
Blien (2003) for surveys.
5He uses U.S. data (CPS and the PSID).
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We translate this into an empirical model of the form
w∗i,r,t =
2∑
p=1
bp ur,t−p + xi,r,t g(τ) + αi + δt + i,t (1)
with indexes i = 1, . . . , N for individuals, r = 1, . . . , R for regions (districts)
and t = 1, . . . , T for time. Here, w∗ denotes the natural logarithm of the real
wage6, u is the unemployment rate, α is an individual specific fixed effect, δ
is a time-effect (year dummy), and x contains a set of control variates (age
squared7, establishment size and establishment size squared).
As already mentioned in the literature survey above, the results from ag-
gregate data include workforce composition effects. If workers at the lower
part of the wage distribution face higher risks of becoming unemployed in
recessions, this group will shrink more than the rest of the sample during re-
cessions.8 This composition shift generates wage compression in an mechan-
ical way even if wages of the workers remaining employed respond uniformly
to demand shifts over the whole distribution. Composition effects are highly
important especially for quantile regression analysis since its impact varies
with quantiles. To understand this consider a uniform distribution of wages
in the range [0, 1]. If all workers with wages below the median become unem-
ployed, the minimum of the distribution increases by 0.5 whereas the median
increases only by 0.25. An increase in unemployment affecting all workers
in the lower half of the wage distribution would generate higher response of
the lower quantiles in regression models based on aggregate data. To elimi-
nate this composition effect we estimate fixed effects quantile regressions at
the individual level. I.e. we consider the conditional effect of district level
unemployment on the individual worker.
The micro data analysis has several other advantages compared to aggre-
gate data. First, we are able to exploit differences in regional unemployment
changes to obtain more precise parameter estimates. Second, the increased
number of observations allows us to include a full set of year dummies. Re-
gressions with aggregate data have to capture time effects with linear or
smooth trends. This can generate artificial effects for the other regressors if
the time effects in the data are not smooth enough. A potential disadvan-
tage of our strategy can be seen in the fact that we cannot identify effects
6More precisely, w∗ is the latent uncensored wage. Further details are explained below.
7the linear term of age is collinear to the time dummies and therefore neither feasible
nor required as regressor.
8The composition effect is discussed by Solon et al. (1994) in the context of cyclicality
of U.S. wages. The focus of the paper is, however, on level effects.
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of aggregate unemployment on wages. Our regression models exploit only
regional deviations from aggregate (national) unemployment.
A further possible problem of the model is caused by inter-regional wage
dispersion, i.e. the fact that wage levels differ considerably between districts.
This biases our results since a worker from a low wage district with wage
above the district level median will be located below the median of the total
sample (including high wage districts). These district level differences could
in principle be catched by inclusion of district fixed effects. If the model
contains individual fixed effects too, identification of both individual and
district fixed effects is possible, however, only if enough individuals move
between districts. A small share of district changes in our data set (less
than five percent) makes inclusion of district level fixed effects practically
infeasible.9 Fortunately, the bias caused by inter-regional wage dispersion
shrinks differences between quantiles in our estimated model, implying that
we underestimate true differences between quantiles.
3.2 Data description
All data sets used here are based on the employment register data of the
German National Agency for Labor. These data contain precise and reli-
able information on earnings and several other demographic variables of all
workers covered by the German social security system. The social security
system covers nearly 80 percent of the German workforce, excluding only the
self-employed, civil servants, individuals in (compulsory) military services,
and individuals in so-called ‘marginal jobs’ (marginal jobs are jobs with at
most 15 hours per week or temporary jobs that last no longer than 6 weeks).
Though earnings information is highly reliable (mis-reporting is subject
to severe penalties), working time is reported only in three classes, full time,
part time with at least 50 percent of full time working hours, and part time
with less than 50 percent. To avoid bias due to an imprecise denominator
in hourly wage computations, we restrict our sample to prime-age (20-60
years) full time working men. Furthermore we exclude East-German Work-
ers from our sample to avoid bias due to the economic adjustment process
after re-unification in 1990 (with a chaotic touch at least in the beginning).
9A further crucial problem is caused by the fact that we have to draw small bootstrap
subsamples to obtain the estimates. If a bootrap sample contains no movers between two
district a and b, the corresponding fixed effects cannot be identified. Simply dropping
such ‘degenerate’ bootstrap samples would bias the inference and is therefore not viable.
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Two further restrictions of our data base are censoring of wages and a struc-
tural break in 1984. Wages are right-censored if they exceed the social se-
curity threshold. For the whole sample, censoring is moderate (about 10-15
percent). For the high qualified (college and technical college graduates),
however, more than 50 percent are censored, making this group practically
useless for the quantile regression analysis. Thus this group is dropped from
our data sets. The second data problem, a structural break in earnings re-
porting, is caused by the fact that bonus payments had to be included in
earnings from 1984 onwards. This could invalidate our quantile regressions
since bonus payments play an important role only for earnings above the me-
dian. Our surefire (brute force) solution to the problem is to drop all years
before the structural break.
As will be explained in more detail below, it would be extremely time-
consuming or even infeasible, to employ the whole employment register data
sample in our regressions. Therefore we obtain wages and other demographic
variables from the IABS, a representative 2 percent subsample. Only district
level unemployment (which would be otherwise imprecise) is computed from
the complete register data set. Several other data restrictions and problems
require special treatment. As mentioned above, about 10-15 percent of wages
are top-coded. Censoring exceeds 50 percent for the high qualified (technical
college or college) making reliable estimation of higher quantiles infeasible.
Therefore we restrict our analysis to the medium (completed apprenticeship
training) and low skilled where censoring is about 10 and 2 percent. Though
censoring is moderate for also for the medium qualified, it may have consid-
erable impact at least on the higher conditional quantile estimates.
The empirical implications of the Reder effect are derived for a homoge-
nous group of workers. To mimic this situation with real data, we either can
select a group as homogenous as possible from our sample, or hope to con-
struct it with help of multivariate models by using as many control variates
as possible. Here we combine both approaches. First, we keep only prime
age (20-60 years) full time working male since the attachment of the other
groups (female, part-time) is less strong. Second, formal remuneration and
recruitment regulations in public services leave less discretion to adjust wages
to labor market conditions – at least in the short and medium run. To be
sure that our results are not driven by the public sector, we simply exclude it
from our estimation sample. Third, the effects of labor demand changes on
wages may differ noteworthy between qualification groups. Therefore we es-
timate the model separately for two qualification groups: (1) workers without
completed apprenticeship training and (2) workers with completed appren-
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ticeship training.10 Finally, we drop workers with less than 3 observations
to avoid estimation problems with fixed effects.11 After all these selections,
we have 368 316 remaining obervations from 62 797 unqualified workers and
2 100 974 observations from 23 6070 workers with completed apprenticeship.
4 Estimation
The response in equation (1) is subject to censoring. As a consequence we
can observe w∗i,r,t only if it is smaller than the corresponding censoring point
in time period t — say Ct, where we assume that the latter depends on t
in a non-stochastic manner (and hence is observable for all, even uncensored
observations in the sample). What we observe is the dependent variable
wi,r,t = min
{
Ct,
2∑
p=1
bp(τ)ur,t−p + xi,r,t g(τ) + αi(τ) + δt(τ) + i,r,t
}
(2)
The τ in parentheses denotes the dependence on the corresponding quan-
tile with 0 < τ < 1, though due to the data limitations mentioned above,
we estimate equation (2) only for quantiles τ ∈ {0.15, 0.35, 0.55, 0.75}. Be-
sides the economic reasons stated above, there are also statistical reasons to
use quantile regression on (2), which are extensively discussed in Koenker
(2005).12
Censored quantile regression has been introduced in two seminal papers
by Powell (1984, 1986). Based on the model
Qτ (Yi|xi) = min{Ci, zi β(τ)}
Powell suggested to minimize the objective function∑
i
ρτ (yi −min{Ci, zi β(τ)}) (3)
10As mentioned above, quantile regressions for the high qualified (college or technical
college graduates) would be imprecise and unreliable due to censoring rates above 50
percent.
11In principle, we need at least two observations per person to identify its fixed effect.
We raised this limit to 3 since fixed effects estimates become extremely imprecise otherwise
und persons with less than three spells appear to be a quite selective group.
12He states that “censoring ... has proven to be one of the most compelling rationales
for the use of quantile regression in applied work”.
9
where ρτ () = (τ − 1( ≤ 0)). Under weak regularity conditions, Powell’s es-
timator has desirable large sample properties, but exhibits undesirable prop-
erties in small samples. In addition numerical optimization based on (3) is
extremely cumbersome, even with powerful modern computers.
In order to avoid these problems, several two-step (e.g., Buchinsky &
Hahn (1998) and Khan & Powell (2001)) estimators were proposed in the
literature. It is straightforward to show that the Powell estimator uses
only observations with uncensored prediction. The two-step estimators ex-
ploit this property by selecting the observations with uncensored predic-
tion using binary choice models. Here we follow an ingenious suggestion of
Chernouzhukov & Hong (2002), who, building among others on the work of
Buchinsky & Hahn (1998) and Khan & Powell (2001), propose a three-step
estimation procedure which avoids the difficulties of Powell’s estimator while
reaching its asymptotic efficiency.
A brief outline of our adaption of the procedure will be given in the
following (further details can be found in Chernouzhukov & Hong (2002)).
For expositional brevity we subsume all regressors (unemployment, control
variates and fixed effect dummies) in z and drop region and time indices.
Then the first step (logit) regression explaining not-censoring has the
form
δi = z˙i γ + ζi (4)
where δi is the indicator of not-censoring. The logit regressions do not in-
clude fixed individual effects.13 Instead we try to explain censoring as good
as possible by inclusion of many regressors (14 time dummies, 24 sector dum-
mies, 8 region type dummies, a cubic polynomial in age, establishment size,
establishment size squared, shares of high skilled workers in establishment
and a foreigner dummy).
From this we generate the quantile regression estimation sample J0 by
sorting the predicted values (propensity scores) z˙i γˆ from the logit model and
dropping the 20 percent with lowest propensity score. This appears to be a
surefire choice (since only about percent of the original sample are censored).
Those observations constitute a sub-sample where the quantile hyperplane
zi β(τ) lies below the censoring value Ci. Then, the second step consists of
13As is well known, the conditional logit model eliminates the individual fixed effects re-
quired for the predicted propensity scores below and is therefore not useful in this context.
A consistent fixed effects probit estimator is not available.
10
solving the uncensored quantile regression minimization problem∑
i∈J0
ρτ (yi − zi β(τ)) (5)
Model (2) may appear rather parsimonious at a glance due to the small
number of control variates, but is quite flexible and general, since all time-
invariant (obsvervable and unobservable) factors influencing individual het-
erogeneity are captured by the fixed effects αi. Note that our model effec-
tively exploits district level deviations from national employment because of
the inclusion of time dummies.
Even our 2 percent sample of the register data (IABS) is large. After all
selections 2 100 974 records from 236 070 medium qualification workers and
364 258 records from 62 290 low qualification workers. Since simple transfor-
mations applied in OLS estimation (differencing or within-transformation)
are not viable for quantile regression, all individual fixed effects have to be
estimated directly. Though the development of interior point algorithms for
constrained linear minimization problems has extended computational pos-
sibilities of quantile regression considerably, estimation of more than several
hundred fixed effect coefficients for extremely large data sets remains infea-
sible even with modern powerful computers. As a makeshift we apply the m
out of n bootstrap surveyed by Bickel, Go¨tze, & Zwet (1997). The basic idea
is to draw in every bootstrap replication m observations with replacement
from the estimation sample where m is small compared to n. Then vari-
ances obtained in this way are rescaled (by assuming
√
n-consistency of the
estimator) to infer standard errors for the base population. The crucial ad-
vantage of the approach for our application is that we have to estimate only
m coefficients for the individual fixed effects in every bootstrap replication
but exploit the whole sample to compute the coefficients.14 A disadvantage
is that we implicitly assume normality for the rescaling of variances. Fortu-
nately the bootstrap allows us to check this assumption by comparing the
bootstrapped m− sample coefficients with the normal density. The results of
this exercise can be found in the appendix. They show only minor deviations
between the bootstrapped kernel density estimates and the normal density.
14The standard errors reported in the current version of the paper are computed drawing
persons randomly from the base population. If individuals in a district are hit by common
shocks, inference should account for this by drawing blocks of persons from districts (see
Fitzenberger (1997) for a lucid exposition of the procedure and its properties.) This will
be implemented in future versions.
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A final word of caution. Not too much is known about censored panel
quantile regression models such as (2), since until now only a limited num-
ber of papers simultaneously addressed quantile regression, censoring, and
panel data. Recent works of Koenker (2004) and Lamarche (2006) deal with
quantile regression analysis of fixed effect panel data models. Though from
quite different perspectives, Honore´ (1992) and Hu (2002) are, to the best
of our knowledge, the only papers dealing with LAD regression of censored
panel data models based on the results of Powell (1984) discussed before.
The small and large sample properties of the procedure applied in this paper
remain to be investigated in detail.
5 Results
The empirical model is estimated for low and medium qualification workers
separately. Since censoring (below 2 percent) appears to be negligible for the
low qualified workers, censoring is handled for this group simply by dropping
the censored cells.
Table 1: Effects of unemployment on log wage quantiles. dependent variable:
log real wage
quantile 15 35 55 75
low qualification
effect -0.228 -0.138 -0.074 -0.073
(sd) (0.037) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
difference (eτ − e15) - 0.090 0.153 0.154
(sd) - (0.019) (0.025) (0.032)
medium qualification
effect -0.167 -0.129 -0.073 -0.046
(sd) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
difference (eτ − e15) - 0.042 0.096 0.122
(sd) - (0.008) (0.015) (0.023)
effects are computed as sum of coefficients b1(τ)+b2(τ) and based on 200 bootstrap replica-
tions. All estimates include year dummies, age squared, establishment size, establishment
size squared and individual dummies.
Table 1 contains estimates and bootstrapped standard errors of regres-
sion model (2). The table contains the point estimates of the effects of
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unemployment on wages together with their (sample size adjusted) standard
errors and the corresponding measures for differences between the conditional
quantiles.15 (Coefficients for the control variables and the fixed effects are
not reported to save space but available from the authors on request.) To
start with, consider the upper panel showing the results for the low qualified.
For this group the 15 percent quantile of wages responds with a 0.23 per-
cent decrease to a one percentage point increase of the unemployment rate.
The response shrinks to 0.14, 0.07 and 0.07 percent when we move to the
35, 55 and 75 percent quantiles. The standard errors for the differences of
effect below show that the deviations are highly significant. Results are quite
similar for the medium qualification group but somewhat smaller in absolute
value and more precise due to the larger sample size. This means that lower
quantiles respond more strongly to regional unemployment than the higher
ones, i.e. agrees with Reder’s hypothesis.
As a final rough check of the specification one can compute the mean
over the quantile effects and compare it with the effects from wage curve
estimates.16 This mean is quite similar to the value of about -0.1 reported
in most wage curve estimates.
6 Conclusion
To summarize: our regressions show that lower quantiles of the wage distri-
bution respond more strongly to labor demand changes than the upper part.
All in all our results are suggestive for the Reder hypothesis or the presence of
efficiency wage effects. However, as mentioned in the introduction, a strong
interpretation of the results in favor of the Reder effect rests on the addi-
tional identifying assumption of approximately equal labor demand changes
over the wage distribution. Stronger responses in the lower part of the wage
distribution may be caused either by adjustment of hiring standards or by
larger cyclical variation of labor demand changes for low wage workers. But
both cases are suggestive for the presence of efficiency wage effects. On the
15To check whether the convergence rule for standard errors is valid also for small
samples and our fixed effects design, we run a small simulation study with n = 100
persons (with Ti = 10 observations for each person) and m = 10. (The results are
available from the authors on request. Even for this tiny sample,
√
n-convergence is a
good approximation.
16For a survey of wage curve estimates see Blanchflower & Oswald (2005). Our estimated
quantiles are not symmetric around the mean. Therefore we cannot expect to obtain the
mean exactly.
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other hand, centralized union bargaining models implying opposite effects on
the wage structure are rejected by our results.
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